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I. Introduction 
The last several years have witnessed a revolution in 
the economic theory of gover?ment regulation, a revolution 
which began when economists exploited the assumption that 
government regulators are motivated by the same self­
interest as individuals elsewhere in an economy. Landmark 
contributions to the economic theory of government 
regulation come from George Stigler' and Sam Peltzman. 2 
To Stigler, government regulation is a valuable product 
provided within the political system. Industries wish to 
use government regulation to restrict entry and increase 
product prices and profit. Stigler asserts an individual 
firm has more to gain from favorable government regulation 
than does an individual consumer and that organizing a 
lobbying effort is less costly for a small number of firms 
than for a large number of consumers. Stigler concludes 
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regulators are "captured" by industry and act to increase 
profit to firms in a regulated industry. 
Peltzman extends Stigler's work by asserting 
government regulators maximize political support received 
from both firms and consumers. Political support comes from 
: 
consumers as votes and comes from firms as financial 
contributions. Peltzman's model recognizes the political 
power of voters and thus the importance to government 
regulators of balancing preferences of voters and of the 
regulated industry. 
Other writers use economic theory to examine the role 
of government regulation in particular industries. Thomas 
Moore 3 analyzes government regulation of the trucking 
industry concluding that regulation increases prices and 
returns to labor and capital in that industry. Gregg 
Jarrel1 4 shows how state regulation of electric utilities 
results in higher electricity prices than would have 
occurred without regulation. Ai~line industry regulation is 
examined by Vincent Olson and John Trapan 5 who present 
evidence that airline regulation increases profit to airline 
companies. 
The television industry is not a unique subject for 
economic analysis. In a landmark contribution, Arnold 
Coase' examines actions of the Federal Communications 
Commission and in particular FCC allocation of the 
electromagnetic spectrum to television stations. Coase 
shows how regulation of broadcast television could be 
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simplified by assigning transferable property rights to 
television channels. Other writers try to predict the 
effect introduction of cable television will have on 
commercial broadcast television in particular and the 
television industry in general. Representative of these 
writers, Rolla Park' predicts cable will reduce audience 
share of the major commercial networks and increase audience 
to those independent stations which use cable to show 
programs to an audience in a larger area. 
Although it does not break new theoretical ground, 
this paper makes at least two original contributions. In 
contrast to other work on broadcast television regulation, 
this paper uses the economic theory of government regulation 
to explain behavior of the Federal Communications Commission 
in its treatment of commercial broadcast television and the 
cable industry rather than to propose policies the FCC ought 
to adopt. Such an analysis helps us understand why a 
particular pattern of regulation occurs. 
A second feature of this paper is its dynamic approach 
to government regulation. The paper does not stop by 
explaining the pattern of regulation which once existed or 
the pattern of regulation which now exists. This paper 
shows. how the pattern of regulation of commercial broadcast 
television has changed in a predictable way in response to 
changes in the broadcast industry. 
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II. Government Regulation 
The modern theory of government regulation introduced 
by George Stigler and refined by Sam Peltzman asserts 
government regulators are motivated by the same self­
interest as are consumers in private markets. Since 
government regulators are generally appointed by elected 
officials, or operate under some legislative mandate, a 
government regulator must ultimately satisfy preferences of 
elected officials. Elected officials must in turn get 
reelected to remain in power. Thus, to assure continued 
employment, government regulators act to maximize political 
support. 
In Peltzman's model, a government regulator gains 
political support from two sources. A regulator gains 
political support from firms in the regulated industry as 
financial contributions made to politicians who appoint 
regulators. Firms in an industry give contributions when 
regulations are imposed which increase profit to those 
firms. Peltzman emphasizes governmen~ regulation of price 
of the product regulated firms sell. To increase political 
support from firms in an industry, a government regulator 
enforces a product price which is higher than the price 
which would otherwise occur. 
A government regulator also obtains political support 
from consumers of the regulated industry's product. When 
consumers of the regulated product are voters, a government 
regulator receives political support from consumers as votes 
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for politicians who appoint regulators. A regulator 
increases votes by reducing price the regulated industry's 
product. 
Making reasonable assumptions about industry profit 
functions and the political support function, Peltzman 
derives a number of implications about behavior of 
government regulators, several of which are important for 
this paper. Since a government regulator must recognize the 
polit~cal power of firms in the regulated industry, the 
regulator restricts entry and/or enforces a higher industry 
price than would otherwise occur, and so increases industry 
profit. However, a government regulator does not permit the 
industry to realize all potential profit since enforcing the 
industry profit-maximizing price sacrifices too much 
political support from consumers. Rather, the government 
regulator trades off some industry profit to reduce 
political opposition from consumers. Peltzman's model shows 
how political opposition is mitigated by requiring price 
below that which maximizes industry profit and by altering 
the structure of prices to favor politically responsive 
consumers. Depending on the nature of the political 
response by consumers, the industry may also be forced by 
the regulator to provide costly services to particular 
consumer groups, services the industry would not otherwise 
provide.' A government regulator grants monopoly power to 
an industry but does not allow the industry to fully exploit 
its monopoly power. Instead, to reduce political opposition 
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from consumers, the regulated industry is required to 
transfer some profit to consumers, particularly the most 
politically sensitive consumers. 
III. Commercial Broadcasters 
Like any other business firm, a commercial television 
station exists to earn profit for its owners. Profit 
maximization by firms is assumed in economics and no 
compelling reason to use a different assumption in the case 
of commercial broadcast television presents itself. What 
does make it different from other firms is the unique 
product sold by a television station. Contrary to common 
perception, the product a television station sells to 
advertisers is not commercial time. This fact is readily 
apparent when considering the price an advertisers would be 
willing to pay to a television station to show a commercial 
on a program which has no viewers. Commercial broadcasting 
time is of no value to an advertiser unless potential buyers 
of the advertised product are watching a program on which a . 
commercial is shown. An advertiser wants viewers to see its 
commercials and is willing to pay to expose viewers to the 
commercial message. Thus a commercial television station 
sells to an advertiser the exposure of a viewer to a 
commercial message.' The price an advertiser is willing to 
pay for commercial time is in direct proportion to the 
number (and type) of viewers of the program on which the 
commercial is shown. 
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To change the number of commercial exposures it 
produces, a television station acts to increase the number 
commercial messages on a program or to increase the number 
viewers of the program. To increase the number of viewers 
of a program, a station can increase program quality or a 
station can change other program characteristics. 10 The 
location of its transmitting tower also influences the 
number of viewers of a station's programs. Since the FCC 
exercises regulatory control most obviously in granting 
licenses and construction permits to commercial television 
stations, choice of transmitter location is of particular 
interest in studying government regulation of commercial 
television. 
IV. Entry and Geographic Location 
The first comprehensive system of electromagnetic 
spectrum regulation and station licensing emerged in 1927 in 
response to the chaos which dominated the early years of 
radio broadcasting. Because property rights to radio 
broadcast frequencies were not defined and because of the 
diffjculty in negotiating agreements among existing and 
potential broadcasters, radio stations changed frequency, 
interfered with one another, and acted in a manner 
consistent with firms exploiting a valuable resource to 
which property rights have not been assigned. Congress 
intervened by creating the Federal Radio Commission, 1 1 
charging it with assigning frequencies to radio stations and 
8
 
enforcing regulations to prevent interference between 
signals of different stations. 
In the late 1930's, when it became evident that 
television broadcasting was destined to expand throughout 
the nation, the newly formed Federal Communications 
Commission decided to prevent repetition of the chaos of 
early radio broadcasting by developing a comprehensive 
system of regulation for the then infant television 
industry. After one false start and a three year freeze on 
issuing additional broadcast television licenses, the 
Federal ·Communications Commission in 1952 issued its Sixth 
Report and Order. '2 
The Sixth Report and Order is a comprehensive set of 
broadcast television regulations filling nearly three 
hundred pages of text. Of interest to this paper are 
regulations which affect the geographic distribution of 
stations. At the time of the Sixth Report, about one 
hundred television stations were licensed to operate in the 
United States and seven hundred license applications were 
pending. 13 Rather than simply grant pending or future 
license applications, the FCC assigned to cities one or more 
television frequencies <television channels). The channels 
represent empty slots in which stations currently operate or 
which stations will be permitted to fill at some future 
date. Thus, FCC frequency assignments limit the number of 
stations allowed in each city and define in advance a 
geographic distribution of stations. 
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Creating a comprehensive system of television channel 
allocations in advance does allow the FCC to distribute 
channels in a way that efficiently minimizes signal 
interference between stations. However, the allocation 
scheme chosen by the FCC is not the only possible way to 
allocate frequencies without interference, and the 
allocation scheme chosen by the FCC is consistent with a 
pattern of allocations predicted by the theory of government 
regulation. 
A television station chooses to build a transmitter 
and begin broadcasting if anticipated revenue from sale of 
commercial exposures exceeds long run cost of operation. A 
station chooses to locate its transmitter in the community 
which has the largest anticipated audience for the station's 
programs. Given a choice between broadcasting to a 
community with a large population and broadcasting to a 
community with a small population, a station ordinarily 
chooses to place transmitting equipment in the large 
community, leaving the small community with no television 
station. In fact, small communities obtain a television 
station only after enough stations move to large communities 
that the audience share to a new station in a large 
community is the same as the whole audience in a small 
community. Without regulation of station location, and 
given a limited number of available television channels, 
small communities tend not to receive television stations. 
If the potential number of stations has no technical limit, 
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stations in both large and small cities should have about 
the same number of viewers. 
The Sixth Report and Order of the FCC established a 
pattern of station allocations different than would have 
occurred had stations been able to locate freely. As the 
theory of government regulation predicts, the FCC created a 
structure of station allocations which provides relatively 
more commercial stations to small communities than would 
have occurred with no restrictions. 
The objective of the Federal Communications 
Commission, like all government regulators, is to maximize 
political support received from voters {viewers> and from 
the regulated industry {commercial television stations>. In 
the case of television, viewers surely prefer more stations 
to fewer stations, ceteris paribus. New stations mean more 
viewing options and a greater chance that a viewer's most 
desired program is broadcast at any moment. However, 
additional stations have diminishing marginal value to 
viewers. A viewer finds the first television station in an 
area of greater value than second and subsequent stations. 
To increase political support from viewers, the FCC 
increases the number of television stations in each 
community. Given a choice, however, the FCC prefers at 
least one station be placed in each community before a 
second station is given to another community, since the 
first station in any community has greater value to voters 
than second and subsequent stations. 
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The television industry would also choose to 
distribute television stations more widely among communities 
than would occur with no government restriction. A station 
choosing to locate in a more populous community gives up 
viewers who receive no programs in small communities and 
gains viewers in the populous community. The viewers gained 
in the populous community come in part from viewers of 
existing programs, however. The television industry would 
allow an additional station in a populous community only 
when the number of new viewers in the populous community 
exceeds the number of viewers in the less populous 
community. The industry considers the effect a new station 
has on existing stations. A new station ignores the fact 
that it takes viewers away from an existing station. 
If its objective is to maximize the sum of industry 
profit and given a limited number of channels, an infant 
television industry seeks to distribute stations over a 
wider geographic area than would occur without government 
restrictions. If the Federal Communications Commission 
moves to fulfill the preferences of the television industry, 
the FCC receives political support from the industry. 
To summarize,	 the Federal Communications Commission 
..	 receives political support from both voters and the 
television industry for distributing a limited number of 
stations among communities more widely than would occur 
without restriction. In determining the geographic 
distribution of television stations among communities, both 
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viewers and industry agree television stations should be 
more widely distributed than the distribution which would 
occur under competition. To increase political support from 
viewers and industry, the FCC has a simple decision. 
Evidence shows that the FCC made that decision and has 
enforced a wider geographic distribution of stations than 
would otherwise have occurred. 
The most obvious evidence that FCC choice of 
television station distribution is consistent with the 
theory of government regulation is that a wide distribution 
of television stations is an explicit part of FCC policy. 
The Sixth Report outlines priorities used when original 
station allocations were made. The FCC assigned frequencies 
using the following priorities: a) one television signal to 
each community, b) one television station to each community, 
c) two television signals to each community, d) two 
television stations to each community, e) additional 
stations to communities based on the size of the community. 
The FCC states in the Sixth Report that the actual 
allocation scheme provided at least one station to all 
communities with a population of fifty thousand or more." 
The policy of assuring each community at least one 
television signal is consistent with the theory of 
government regulation and, as shown next, is a wider 




Given the frequency range assigned to television 
broadcasting by the FCC, a community can have a maximum of 
seven VHF and about twelve UHF television stations. All 
twelve VHF channels and sixty-nine UHF channels assigned by 
the FCC cannot be used in a given community because of 
interference between some adjacent VHF channels, 
interference between adjacent UHF channels, and between some 
nonadjacent UHF channels. However, no city in the United 
States was given the maximum possible number of commercial 
stations. The market area with the largest number of 
television viewers, New York,15 is assigned six VHF channels 
and no UHF channels, although signals of seven UHF channels 
assigned to nearby communities can be received in New York. 
The second largest market, Los Angeles, is assigned the 
maximum possible number of VHF channels (seven) and three 
UHF channels. An additional seven UHF channels from nearby 
communities can be received in parts of Los Angeles. All 
other cities in the United States are assigned fewer VHF and 
UHF channels. 
FCC station allocation provided'relatively more 
channels to smaller communities. Virtually all channels 
allocated to commercial broadcast television are occupied by 
stations in large cities, but not all allocated channels are 
being used in small communities. In the twenty television 
market areas with the largest number of television viewers, 
only one of seventy-eight VHF channel allocations remains 
unoccupied by a commercial television station. In those 
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same twenty largest market areas, only ten of sixty-nine UHF 
channel allocations remain unoccupied and seven of the ten 
unoccupied allocations "have one or more license application 
pending before the FCC. By contrast, in the smallest twenty 
television markets, three of eighteen VHF channel 
allocations remain unoccupied and nine of nineteen or nearly 
half of UHF allocations remain unoccupied. FCC choice of 
station allocations has restricted entry in large markets 
and encouraged entry in small markets. 
Evidence also shows stations would broadcast on the 
additional channels available in large cities had the 
maximum possible number of channels been assigned to large 
cities by the FCC. Because of the station assignment policy 
of the FCC, large cities have more television households per 
commercial television station than do small cities. With no 
FCC regulation, if other characteristics and cost of station 
operation are similar in large and small cities, population 
per station or number of station~ per population would be 
similar in small and large cities. However, the twenty 
largest markets currently have an average of 272,000 
television households per operating commercial station 
versus 22,500 television households per operating commercial 
station in the twenty smallest markets. That stations 
continue to operate with only 22,500 households viewing 
suggests far more stations would enter large markets if 




In the first years of television, each of the three 
major radio networks established networks of operating 
television stations and stations applying for FCC licenses 
to operate. The major threat of new station and network 
entry came from the DuMont Television Network. During the 
three years the FCC used to put together the table of 
channel assignments, DuMont sought to influence FCC 
decisions. The changes sought by DuMont are predictable and 
FCC response to DuMont petitions shows clearly how the FCC 
chose a pattern of station allocations different than would 
otherwise have occurred. DuMont proposed to increase the 
number of channels in more densely populated areas and 
reduce the number of 'stations in less densely populated 
areas. DuMont proposed a minimum of four commercial VHF 
channels be assigned to all large cities. DuMont also 
wanted to reduce the geographic distance between stations 
having the same or adjacent channels. Finally, and most 
revealing, DuMont wanted to shift some VHF allocations from 
small cities to large cities. t ' DuMont felt that without 
its proposed alterations it could not survive as a network 
because insufficient stations would exist under the FCC plan 
which were not members of the three major networks. DuMont 
was not making an idle threat. The FCC rejected DuMont's 
proposals and within three years DuMont ceased all 
operation.t 7 
The FCC could have allocated more channels to large 
cities and fewer to small cities. The unoccupied 
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allocations in smaller cities and petitions by the DuMont 
network confirms the FCC sought a wider distribution of 
signals than would have occurred under competition. 
v. Small Group Interests 
One important implication of the theory of government 
regulation is that a government regulator gives special 
.recognition to politically powerful consumer groups. This 
implieation explains why government regulators frequently 
set prices to some consumer groups which are below average 
cost and even below marginal cost, even when such pricing is 
not consistent with perfect price discrimination. The bulk 
of consumers subsidize these consumer groups by paying 
relatively higher prices. In addition, a regulated industry 
is often required to provide products or services to 
consumer groups that the industry would not otherwise 
provide. As the theory predicts, the Federal Communications 
Commission requires broadcasters .to provide a set of special 
services which otherwise would not be provided. Actions 
required by the FCC include requirements for public service 
broadcasting and the requirement of what the FCC calls 
community ascertainment. 
The FCC uses a polite form of extortion to encourage 
television stations to show public service programs. The 
Chief of the FCC Broadcast Bureau is required to bring 
before the full Commission any television license renewal 
application which proposes to show public service material 
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for less than five percent of a program day. A license may 
be revoked if a station shows less public service material 
than it proposes to show in its renewal application." 
The five percent minimum for public service programs 
is a modification of an earlier standard requiring that a 
minimum of ten percent of a program day be devoted to 'news 
and public affairs programs. In the 1970's, news programs 
became increasingly popular to viewers and television 
stations increased news programming at the expense of public 
service programs. In 1976, the FCC established a separate 
minimum for public service programs." Had the FCC not 
adopted a separate standard for public service programs, 
stations would have produced fewer public service programs. 
The FCC is forcing stations to produce more of one type of 
program than stations would produce without regulation. The 
FCC gains political support from organizations which receive 
free public service promotion. 
FCC community ascertainment requirements are another 
example of the FCC requiring a station to act in ways which 
it would otherwise not act, and show how the FCC uses 
regulation to mitigate opposition from powerful political 
groups. Among material it must keep on public file and 
submit with its annual report to the FCC, a station must 
"ascertain" ten community problems or needs. Ascertainment 
is supposed to include community surveys, interviews with 
community leaders, and unsolicited comments submitted to the 
station. A station must include in the public file a list 
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of activities or programs which address these problems and 
needs. 20 Placing ten community needs on file seems innocent 
enough. However, the process of ascertainment is costly and 
complicated for a station. A? entire publication produced 
by the national television trade association is devoted to 
helping stations with ascertainment. 21 The FCC also 
released an extensive guide to ascertainment. 22 
Ascertainment is an activity required by the FCC in 
which'a station would otherwise not engage. A television 
station does not ignore the community of course. Financial 
success of a station depends on producing programs which 
attract viewers. Stations spend substantial resources on 
viewer surveys, Nielsen ratings being the most obvious 
example. Without the FCC requirement, however, a station 
has no incentive to survey the community or community 
leaders to find out community needs and problems. 
Ascertainment is used by the FCC to mitigate political 
opposition to television regulation and is used to increase 
political support from those whose "needs" are recognized. 
Ascertainment taps some economic profit granted to a 
television station by the FCC and transfers it to other 
politically powerful groups. The fact that stations must 
consider views of community leaders and views expressed in 
unsolicited comments means ascertainment gives most 
consideration to politically powerful and vocal community 
members. Regulation theory predicts this same result. 
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Regulation is used to mitigate opposition from the most 
powerful or vocal consumer groups first. 
VI. Cable Television 
Treatment by the Federal Communications Commission of 
cable television provides an excellent application of the 
theory of government regulation. In particular, the theory 
is applied to an industry which has dramatically changed in 
the last several years causing interesting though 
predictable changes in the form of government regulation. 
Astoria, Oregon is credited with establishing the 
first cable television system in 1949. 23 Community Antenna 
Television (CATV), as it was then labelled, developed first 
in cities denied television stations during the FCC license 
freeze of 1948. Cable operators installed equipment to 
receive signals from television stations in other cities and 
then charged subscribers a fee to hook up to the receiving 
equipment. 
The FCC was aware of the first cable systems. An FCC 
lawyer inspected a number of systems during the early years 
of cable and circulated a memo suggesting the FCC regulate 
CATV systems as common carriers. The FCC ignored the memo 
and chose not to regulate cable television. Existing 
broadcast stations had no objection to early cable systems 
since existing stations could only gain from the increase in 
their effective range. Cable systems represented no threat 
to existing stations. 
20 
After the end of the television license freeze in 
1952, commercial broadcasters became more sensitive to the 
existence and growth of cable systems. Cable systems 
appeared in cities which already had commercial stations or 
where commercial stations were being built. Now cable was 
attracting viewers away from local programs by using signals 
from other cities. Any signals imported to an area reduced 
audience size of local stations. No regulation required 
cable 'systems to pay program royalties and cable systems 
could import programs to a market even when a local station 
had been granted exclusive right to show that program. In 
early cable systems, a cable subscriber could not choose to 
watch local stations unless signals from local stations were 
received by the cable system. Local stations often had to 
compete with high quality signals of a distant station shown 
by a cable system. 
In 1955 150,000 households subscribed to cable. 2• In 
1958 the FCC denied a request by commercial broadcasters to 
assert control over cable. 25 By 1960 650,000 households 
were cable subscribers and the FCC could no longer ignore 
pleas of broadcasters. In a 1962 decision, 2' upheld by the 
Supreme Court,2' the FCC denied permission for Carter 
Mountain Cable Company to use a microwave repeater because 
of economic damage a cable system would do to local 
stations. The threat of additional FCC action, however, did 
not stop cable growth in other communities. By 1965 1.28 
million households were cable subscribers. 
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The FCC in 1966 issued its first series of cable 
regulations. 21 The regulations required cable systems to 
carryall local television signals and forbade cable systems 
from importing a signal which duplicated a local station. 
Cable operators were also forbidden to carry syndicated 
material which duplicated a local station within fifteen 
days of the time the local station showed the program. 2 ' 
In 1968 the FCC went a step farther and forbade cable 
syste~sfrom importing a television signal without 
permission of the originating station. 30 The 1968 decision 
discouraged expansion of cable systems since permission from 
the originating station was often not forthcoming. The 
decision also represented the limit on FCC restriction of 
cable television. 
By 1970 4.5 million households subscribed to cable and 
the political power of cable television interests could no 
longer be ignored by the FCC. In 1972 the FCC revised its 
regulations, again allowing cable systems to use the signal 
of a station without that station's permission. 31 
In 1980 the number of cable subscribers had grown to 
nearly 13 million. Political power of cable television 
interests was so great that the FCC discarded rules which 
required cable systems to import certain signals and 
discarded rules which prevented cable systems from importing 
programs to which local stations had been given exclusive 
right. 32 The FCC decision was made despite an unprecedented 
effort by local broadcasters and by the National Association 
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of Broadcasters, the main television trade association and 
lobbying group. By October, 1974 the NAB had spent $480,000 
and committed an additional $400,000 to efforts to stop 
cable subscription television. 33 The NAB budget for 1980 
included $656,000 for government activities, nearly ten 
percent of the total NAB budget. 34 A substantial portion of 
the money for government activities was committed to 
stopping the growth of cable television. As of December 
1982, ~29 million households subscribe to cable, representing 
about thirty-five percent of television viewers. 35 
The pattern of regulation over time is clear. In 
years when it represented no threat to broadcast stations, 
cable was ignored by the FCC. As cable posed an increasing 
threat to politically powerful broadcast interests, FCC 
cable regulation grew increasingly restrictive. At some 
point, political power of cable operators and users became 
large enough that their interests had to be recognized by 
FCC regulation. 
VII. Summary 
The theory of government regulation refined by Sam 
Peltzman asserts government regulators maximize political 
support received from voters and from the regulated 
industry. Because political support comes from both 
regulated firms and from voters, a government regulator 
cannot completely ignore preferences of either group. The 
Federal Communications Commission receives political support 
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from commercial television stations and from television 
viewers. The main regulatory tool of the FCC is its power 
to assign television channels to communities and to grant 
licen~es to applicants for those television channels. The 
FCC has used its regulatory power to establish a geographic 
pattern of television station locations different than would 
otherwise have occurred, but a pattern predictable by the 
theory of government regulation. 
·with no FCC restriction on station location and given 
a limited number of television channels, stations tend to 
neglect small cities since the audience size in a small city 
is smaller than the audience available to an entering 
station in a large city even if the large city has several 
existing television stations. A television station entering 
a large city takes some viewers away from existing stations. 
The television industry gains more viewers, with no increase 
in cost, if the FCC reduces the number of stations in large 
cities and encourages entry in small cities, thus 
recognizing the effect a new station has on viewers of 
existing stations. 
The FCC gains political support from viewers by 
increasing the number of television channels in a city, 
since additional viewing options are valuable to consumers. 
However, television viewers have diminishing marginal value 
of additional television stations. The first television 
station in a community earns for the FCC more political 
support than a second or subsequent station earns. Thus, to 
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increase political support from both the commercial 
television industry and from television viewers, the FCC 
encourages station entry in small cities and restricts entry 
in large cities. 
To increase political support from politically active 
consumer groups, the FCC requires stations to provide 
programs and services which they otherwise would not 
provide, just as is predicted by the theory of government 
regulation. Community ascertainment rules require stations 
to recognize interests of politicians and vocal consumer 
groups. Public service program requirements recognize 
interests of socially active community groups. 
Regulation of cable television by the FCC serves as an 
excellent example of how treatment of an industry by a 
regulator changes over time in a predictable way as the 
structure of the industry changes. When they were first 
introduced, cable systems represented no threat to existing 
commercial television stations and so were ignored by the 
broadcast television industry and by the FCC. As they 
became more common in cities where commercial television 
stations already existed, cable systems attracted the 
attention of the broadcast television industry and of the 
FCC since existing stations were losing viewers to the cable 
systems. In response, the FCC introduced ever more 
restrictive cable regulations. When the cable industry 
became powerful enough, its interests and the interests of 
consumers using cable systems, had to be recognized by FCC 
25 
regulations. The FCC relaxed its restrictive cable 
regulations in stages. Current FCC cable regulations place 
few restrictions on the signals a cable system can transmit 
to subscribers. 
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